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INTRODUCTION

Some cases require courts to address the difficult balance between individual human rights and national security. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan'
("Jeppesen 1') was one of those cases. The five plaintiffs in Jeppesen II were
subjects of the extraordinary rendition program, which is executed by the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). The plaintiffs alleged that they endured egregious torture at the hands of the United States government as it worked in concert with a United States corporation, Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., and foreign governments.2 Plaintiff Ahmed Agiza alleged that he was "severely and repeatedly
beaten and subjected to electric shock through electrodes attached to his ear
lobes, nipples and genitals." Another plaintiff, Elkassim Britel, alleged that he
was "deprived of sleep and food and threatened with sexual torture, including
sodomy with a bottle and castration. " This Note, using Jeppesen Ito illustrate,
argues that the federal judiciary has allowed human rights to be eclipsed by the
national security interests pursued by the Executive Branch. Others have made
similar arguments.5 In giving excessive deference to the Executive Branch's
claims of privilege under the judicially-created "state secrets doctrine," the federal judiciary has undertaken a "complete abandonment of judicial control ...
lead[ing] to intolerable abuses." 6 Victims of the extraordinary rendition pro614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) [hereinafter
1
Jeppesen Il]. Initially, the Northern District of California dismissed the case under the Totten bar.
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Then a three judge
panel reversed, holding that the Plaintiffs' prima facie claims could go forward. Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Jeppesen I]. Next, the
Ninth Circuit dismissed the case under the Reynolds privilege. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,
Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009). Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011). The Totten bar and the Reynolds privilege are examined in detail throughout this Note. Together, these distinct judge-made
doctrines comprise the state secrets doctrine.
2
See Jeppesen I, 614 F.3d at 1075-76.
Id. at 1074.
Id. For background information on the extraordinary rendition program, see John T. Parry,
The Shape of Modern Torture: ExtraordinaryRendition and Ghost Detainees, 6 MELB. J. INT'L L.
516 (2005).
See, e.g., Erin E. Langley, The Loss ofAmerican Values in the Case ofErroneousIrregular
Rendition, 98 GEO. L.J. 1441 (2010) (discussing the problems of a public policy that so heavily
favors national security at the expense of human rights). See also Laura K. Donahue, The Shadow
of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 77 (2010).
6
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953) (analogizing the state secrets doctrine to
the privilege against self-incrimination for the purpose of explaining the Court's task of upholding
the state secrets doctrine without giving too much deference to the Executive's privilege claims).
4
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gram, like the plaintiffs in Jeppesen II, should have a monetary remedy under
the Alien Tort Statute.
Part II of this Note gives the background of the state secrets doctrine,
which stems from only three Supreme Court cases. Part III gives a brief overview of the holdings of the Jeppesen II majority opinion. Part IV argues that the
Alien Tort Statute should be constructed in a manner that allows plaintiffs to
obtain judgments against transnational corporations that help the United States
government commit torts against foreign nationals. Part V then exposes the
shortcomings of alternate congressional remedies suggested by the Jeppesen II
majority. Next, Part VI elaborates on the workable framework put forth by
Judge Michael D. Hawkins in his dissenting opinion and further explains the
flaws of the reasoning employed by the majority's construction of the state secrets doctrine. In order to restore the balance between national security and human rights, federal courts should adopt Judge Hawkins' more narrow approach
to applying the state secrets doctrine, thereby compensating victims of the extraordinary rendition program under the Alien Tort Statute.
II.

THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE

The state secrets doctrine refers to two judicially created rules-one is a
non-justiciability doctrine and the other is evidentiary-that apply to factual
situations implicating state secrets within national security concerns. The
nonjusticiability doctrine is the Totten bar, which was created in Totten v. United States.8 The Totten bar "applies only when the 'very subject matter' of the
action is a state secret" 9 and requires complete dismissal of a case. Different
courts have different ideas regarding the scope of the Totten bar, but the prevailing trend has been an expansive application of the bar. The other rule is the
Reynolds privilege, which was created in United States v. Reynolds.'o The Reynolds privilege does not automatically require dismissal of a case, but can require
summary judgment if at least one of three conditions is met: (1) "the plaintiff
cannot prove the prima facie elements of her claim with non-privileged evidence"; (2) "the privilege deprives the defendant of information that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim"; or (3) if further litigating the case would present an unjustifiable risk of disclosing state secrets because privileged evidence is inseparable from non-privileged information that
will be necessary to the claims or defenses. "

7
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). This statute provided the cause of action in Jeppesen II. It is examined in detail below. See infra Part IV.
92 U.S. 105 (1876).
9

1o
11

Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d at 1084.
345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953).
Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d at 1083.
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Totten v. United States: The Source of the Totten Bar

In Totten, the plaintiff was the administrator of an intestate estate. 12 The
plaintiff brought an action to recover compensation for services allegedly rendered by the intestate under a contract with President Abraham Lincoln.13 The
plaintiff alleged that the intestate had agreed to spy on the insurrectionary states
during the time of the Civil War and reported the intelligence gathered to President Lincoln. 14 The Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly dismissed the action because the service stipulated by the alleged contract was a
secret in and of itself.15 Public policy forbade the "maintenance of any suit in a
court ofjustice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters that the law itself regards as confidential."1 6 Totten thus held that a contract
for secret services between an intestate and the government is a fact not to be
disclosed in litigation. It follows that any lawsuit based on such a fact is nonjusticiable and must be dismissed at the outset. 17
Since Totten was decided in 1875, the Supreme Court has applied the
Totten bar in only three other cases: Weinberger v. CatholicAction of Hawaii,18
Tenet v. Doe, 19 and most recently in GeneralDynamics Corp. v. United States. 20
In Weinberger, the Court held that the Totten bar precluded a lawsuit for information regarding the possible environmental consequences of a military facility
that was allegedly going to be used to store nuclear weapons.2' Particularly, the
Weinberger plaintiffs sought to enjoin the construction of a military facility that
was allegedly to be used for the storage of weapons.22 To show the need for an
injunction, the plaintiffs sought to compel the United States Navy to prepare and
disclose a report known as an "Environmental Impact Statement," 23 which was
required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") if a facil12

92 U.S. at 105.

13

Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106.
See id.
Id. at 107.
See Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d 1070, 1096 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
454 U.S. 139 (1981).
544 U.S. 1 (2005).
131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011).
Weinberger,454 U.S. at 140-41.

14
15
16
17
18

20
21

Id. at 142.
See id "An Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA] is a document prepared by a federal
agency in order to determine whether a formal Environmental Impact Statement should be prepared." See 40 CFR § 1508.9 (1981). If the EIA shows that the construction will have no significant environmental impact, then no Environmental Impact Statement [EIS] is required at the construction stage. See Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 141. Because the EIA in Weinberger reportedly
showed that the construction would have no significant environmental impact, the Navy did not
prepare an EIS. Id.
22
23
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ity was capable of storing nuclear weapons. 24 But the Court found that an exemption under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") barred the plaintiffs
from forcing the Navy to confirm whether it planned to store nuclear weapons at
the military facility. 2 5 Additionally, Weinberger held that the Totten bar also
prohibited the Court from scrutinizing the Navy's alleged non-compliance with
NEPA because such an inquiry "would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential." 26 Weinberger thus made the
Totten bar applicable in one other type of lawsuit-a lawsuit against the government for secret information.27
Recently, in General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 28 the Court applied the Totten bar to a contract dispute between the Navy and two private
companies that agreed in 1988 to develop a stealth aircraft for the Navy. 29 The
government sought return of funds it paid to the contractors for work that the
government ultimately rejected.30 Meanwhile, the contractors sought to assert an
affirmative defense that is well-established in this context. 3 1 Particularly, the
contractors claimed that they breached the contract because the government
refused to provide them with information to assist the development of the stealth
aircraft. 32 The government admitted that it possessed this information but refused to disclose it to the contractors because the information was secret. In a
very narrow holding, General Dynamics decided that "[w]here liability depends
upon the validity of a plausible superior-knowledge defense, and when full litigation of that defense 'would inevitably lead to the disclosure of state secrets,

See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
See Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 145 ("Since the public disclosure requirements of NEPA are
governed by FOIA, it is clear that Congress intended that the public's interest in ensuring that
federal agencies comply with NEPA must give way to the Government's need to preserve military
secrets."). Thus, the FOIA alone was an independent basis for dismissal of Weinberger. The Court
did not even need to rely on the state secrets doctrine.
26
Id. at 146-47 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)).
27
Then, in Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005), the Court affirmed Totten's more than century-old
holding, precluding a suit by plaintiffs who alleged that they were former espionage agents for the
United States government. Id. at 3-4. The plaintiffs sought to compel the government to compensate them, alleging that they were entitled to the financial assistance under the terms of a secret
agreement with the government. See id at 4-5. Tenet, then, did nothing to further expand Totten
because the holdings of both cases were the same: A secret agreement between the government
and the plaintiff was non-justiciable because such an agreement is a fact not to be disclosed in
litigation.
28
131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011).
29
Id. at 1903.
30
See id.
31
Id. at 1904.
24
25

32

See id.

33

Id.
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neither party can obtain judicial relief."34 The contractors thus did not have to
return the funds sought by the government.
Despite these cases, little about the Totten bar has changed since 1876.
Like Totten and Tenet, General Dynamics consisted of a secret agreement between private parties and the government. Thus, General Dynamics does not
add much to this line of Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has applied the Totten bar to only three factual situations: (1) a secret agreement between the plaintiff and the government; 35 (2) a lawsuit for information regarding
the storage of nuclear weapons;36 and (3) a contract dispute between the government and private contractors who were asserting a superior knowledge defense.3 1 It is also worth emphasizing that the Totten bar precludes the adjudication of a dispute even when a prima facie claim is supported by privileged evidence. 38 Because the Totten bar is such a sure extinguisher of claims, this Note
argues that the Totten bar should be applied infrequently and only in a context
that is factually similar to Totten itself, Weinberger, Tenet, or General Dynamics. The Totten bar should never have been expanded by lower federal courts to
cases, like Jeppesen II, where foreign nationals claim they were victims of torture in the CIA's highly-publicized extraordinary rendition program.
B.

United States v. Reynolds: The Source of the Reynolds Privilege

United States v. Reynolds comprises the other half of the judiciallycreated state secrets doctrine.39 Unlike the Totten bar, the Reynolds privilege
does not always require complete dismissal of the claim. In United States v.
Reynolds, the plaintiffs were widows of three civilian observers who died in a
military plane crash. 40 The Air Force had conducted an accident investigation
and produced an accompanying report.4 1 When the plaintiffs sought production
of the report, the Air Force asserted that the report was privileged under Air
Force rules because the personnel on board at the time of the crash were engaged in a highly secret Air Force mission.42 When the Air Force declined to
produce the documents for the district court, the district court ordered that the
issue of negligence would be established in the plaintiffs' favor.43 The Air Force
appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Air
34
3
36
3
38
39
40

Id. at 1902 (citation omitted).
See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011).
Id. at 1903.
345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953).
Id. at 3.

41

See id. at 3.

42

Id. at 4.

43

Id. at 5.
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Force properly asserted a privilege against revealing state secrets. Instead of
dismissing the case, the Court remanded it to give the plaintiffs the opportunity
to prove the underlying facts with non-privileged evidence." Today, judges and
courts disagree on the particular circumstances that warrant dismissal of a claim
under the Reynolds privilege. 45 In fact, Jeppesen II applied the Reynolds privilege as if it was the Totten bar.46 This issue is discussed below in further detail.
III. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE MAJORITY'S HOLDINGS IN MOHAMED V.
JEPPESENDATAPLAN, INC.
In deciding Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,Inc., the Ninth Circuit reviewed Totten and Reynolds. As this Part will demonstrate, the majority opinion
both construed the Totten bar too broadly and unnecessarily dismissed the case
against the government and Jeppesen Dataplan under the Reynolds privilege.
Although it did not apply the Totten bar to dismiss the case, the Jeppesen II majority's analysis failed to distinguish Weinberger from the lawsuit by the foreign
nationals in Jeppesen II. Additionally, Jeppesen II erroneously applied the
Reynolds privilege prospectively to dismiss the case in its entirety at the outset
of the litigation. Instead, the Jeppesen II majority should have allowed the case
to go forward. This Note argues that the plaintiffs had a prima facie claim under
the Alien Tort Statute and might well have had enough non-privileged evidence
to win the case or force Jeppesen Dataplan to settle.47
A.

The Facts and ProceduralHistory ofJeppesen Dataplan

The five Jeppesen plaintiffs were foreign nationals, who alleged broadly
that the CIA worked with foreign governments to operate an "extraordinary
rendition program, to gather intelligence by apprehending foreign nationals susId. at 11 (explaining that the plaintiffs' necessity for the privileged information was greatly
minimized by the availability of non-privileged evidence which would still allow the plaintiffs to
make their case). This Note argues that the Jeppesen II court should have allowed the plaintiffs to
make their case with non-privileged evidence. In fact, when Judge Hawkins wrote the Jeppesen I
opinion, the reason for remand was based largely on the availability of non-privileged evidence:
"[T]he Reynolds privilege .. . cannot be invoked to prevent a litigant from persuading a jury of the
truth or falsity of an allegation by reference to non-privileged evidence, regardless whether privileged evidence might also be probative of the truth or falsity of the allegation." Jeppesen I, 579
F.3d 943, 957-58 (9th Cir. 2009). Part V, infra, further expounds on the viability of Judge Hawkins's approach.
4s
See generally Steven D. Schwinn, The State Secrets Privilege in the Post-9/11 Era, 30 PACE
L. REv. 778, 790-801 (2010), availableat http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/23 (discussing the different approaches that courts take in applying the Reynolds privilege and the Totten
bar).
4
See infra text accompanying notes 156-162.
47
The Jeppesen II majority expressly eschewed deciding whether the claims were cognizable
under the Alien Tort Statute. See Jeppesen H1, 614 F.3d 1070, 1084 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010). Part IV,
infra, discusses the disagreement over the parameters of the Alien Tort Statute in detail.
4
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pected of involvement in terrorist activities and transferring them in secret to
foreign countries for detention and interrogation by United States or foreign
officials." 48 Each plaintiff also claimed that he was illegally detained and tortured through the extraordinary rendition program.4 9 Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that public information showed that Jeppesen Dataplan, a U.S. corporation, assisted the aircraft and crew on all of the flights transporting the plaintiffs
among the various locations where they were detained and allegedly subjected
to torture.50 The plaintiffs sued under the Alien Tort Statute 1 alleging seven
theories of liability under two claims, "forced disappearance" and "torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." 2 The United States government
moved to intervene and dismiss. The district court entered judgment in favor of
Jeppesen, stating that "at the core of Plaintiffs' case against Defendant Jeppesen
are 'allegations' of covert U.S. military or CIA operations in foreign countries
against foreign nationals-clearly a subject matter which is a state secret."53
On appeal, a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the government had failed to establish a basis for dismissal
under the state secrets doctrine.5 4 Circuit Judge Hawkins wrote the opinion
("Jeppesen I"), which held Totten inapplicable because the plaintiffs were thirdparty plaintiffs and had no secret contract with the government.55 Jeppesen I
further held that Reynolds did not require dismissal of the claims because "the
privilege applies to prevent discovery of the evidence itself and not litigation of
the truth or falsity of the information that might be contained within it." 56 Here,
the court was referring to the public information on which the plaintiffs' claims
were partly based. While the privilege could be asserted to prevent disclosure of
the communications themselves, the privilege could not prevent the plaintiffs
from proving the underlying facts with non-privileged public information.

Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d at 1073.
See id. at 1073-75.
5o
Id. at 1075. The appendix at the end of Jeppesen II lists voluminous public information that
helps establish the claims of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1102. Perhaps the most disturbing public statement was made by a former employee of Jeppesen Dataplan named Bob Overby, who referred to
the extraordinary rendition flights as "torture flights." Id. at 1108. Taken with all the other public
information regarding the nature and activities of the extraordinary rendition program, Overby's
statement lends significant credence to the claims of the Jeppesen II plaintiffs.
5
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.").
52
Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d at 1075.
s3
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
5
Jeppesen I, 579 F.3d 943, 944 (9th Cir. 2009).
ss
See id at 954.
56
Id. at 957.
48
49

57

Id
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Next, the Ninth Circuit took the case en banc "to resolve questions of
exceptional importance regarding the scope and application of the state secrets
doctrine."s 8 Applying the state secrets doctrine, the Jeppesen II court noted that
the case required it to balance the fundamental principles of liberty and national
security. 9 The court dismissed the case under the Reynolds privilege, holding
that there was "no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen's alleged liability without
creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets."a Although Jeppesen II
did not decide whether the Totten bar applied to the claims,' the court did state
that "some of [the] plaintiffs' claims might well fall within the Totten bar. 62
The Majority Construedthe Totten Bar Too Broadly

B.

The Jeppesen II majority was an en banc decision written by Circuit
Judge Fisher. While Judge Fisher acknowledged that the Totten bar "applies
only when the 'very subject matter' of the action is a state secret,"" he seemed
hesitant to limit the scope of the bar's possible application:
We also disagree with plaintiffs' related contention that the Totten bar cannot apply unless the plaintiff is a party to a secret
agreement with the government. The environmental groups and
individuals who were the plaintiffs in Weinberger were not parties to agreements with the United States, secret or otherwise.
The purpose of the bar, moreover, is to prevent the revelation of
state secrets harmful to national security, a concern no less
pressing when the plaintiffs are strangers to the espionage
agreement that their litigation threatens to reveal. Thus, even if
plaintiffs were correct that the Totten bar is limited to cases
premised on espionage agreements with the government, we
would reject their contention that the bar is necessarily limited
to cases in which the plaintiffs are themselves parties to those
agreements.
In its remarks, the Jeppesen II majority failed to distinguish Weinberger, which was a suit for information under FOIA, from the case before the
Jeppesen II court. Considering the devastating nature of the Totten bar to the
5
5

6
61

See Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1073.
Id at 1087.
See id. at 1084.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 1070.

6

Id. at 1084.

65

Id. at 1079.
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claims of aggrieved persons, the federal circuit courts should not expand it beyond the factual circumstances of the three Supreme Court cases that applied the
Totten bar. Additionally, the majority ignored the fact that public information
existed to confirm the relationship between the United States government and
Jeppesen Dataplan. Public information is not secret information. Thus, if public
information is sufficient to state a claim against the government, the Totten bar
should be inapplicable. As noted above, the appendix attached to the Jeppesen II
opinion clearly details numerous sources of public information that could have
been used by the plaintiffs to prove their case against Jeppesen Dataplan. The
activities of the United States government in the extraordinary rendition were no
secret by the time Jeppesen II was decided. Thus, applying the Totten bar to the
facts of Jeppesen II would not have served the purpose of "prevent[ing] the revelation of state secrets harmful to national security" because much of the public
had already believed that subjects of the extraordinary rendition program were
being tortured. As Part III shows, rather than preventing state secrets from being
revealed, Jeppesen II illuminated the eclipse of human rights.
C.

The Jeppesen II Majority Wrongly Applied the Reynolds PrivilegeProspectively.

Drawing support from the Fourth Circuit, 66 Jeppesen II applied the
Reynolds privilege prospectively to hold "that dismissal is nonetheless required
under Reynolds because there is no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen's alleged
liability without creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets."67 Alt
hough the Fourth Circuit consistently applies the Reynolds privilege prospectively, the Jeppesen II majority is actually just relying on dicta from AlHaramainIslamic Foundation,Inc. v. Bush. 6 8 Notably, Al-Haramain dismissed
its case under the Totten bar, not the Reynolds privilege.69 In a lengthy footnote,
the majority acknowledged that it previously condemned, in Al-Haramain, the
prospective use of the Reynolds privilege because it erroneously conflates "the
Totten bar's 'very subject matter' inquiry with the Reynolds privilege." 70 In the
same footnote, the court makes a strained attempt to distinguish El-Masri's "erroneous conflation of the Totten bar" and those cases in which the Reynolds
privilege can be properly applied at the pleading stage of the litigation.71 The

See id. at 1081 (citing El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308 (4th Cir. 2007); AlHaramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1201 (9th Cir. 2007); Farnsworth Cannon,
Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1980)).
67
Id. at 1087.
68
507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007).
69
Other important factual differences between Al-Haramain and Jeppesen II are discussed
infra.
70
Jeppesen I, 614 F.3d at 1087.
6

71

Id.
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court's explanation amounts to a distinction without a difference.72 Thus,
Jeppesen II actually made the same error for which the Ninth Circuit had criticized the Fourth Circuit. Part III of this Note further articulates the problems
with the cases and propositions relied upon by the majority and further explains
why the Reynolds privilege should not be applied prospectively.
IV.
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO ALLOW ALIEN
TORT PLAINTIFFS TO COLLECT AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
LIKE JEPPESEN DATAPLAN.
The Alien Tort Statute has been around for a long time. In fact, it was
passed by the first Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.73 The text is
brief: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States." 74 This seemingly simple text has proved to be a fertile
topic of academic and practical discussion. From the time the statute was passed
and until the year 1980, it was largely a dormant statute. 75 Then, Filartigav.
76
was decided by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In
Pena-Irala
Filartiga, the seventeen-year-old son of a politically active
Joelito
Filartiga,
Paraguayan, was kidnapped and tortured to death by a man who was affiliated
with the Paraguayan government.77 The man who committed the murder eventually came to the United States and was arrested for staying well past the expiration of his visa. The sister of the slain Joelito was also in the United States
during this time. Upon learning of Pena's arrest, Joelito's sister filed suit for
wrongful death under the Alien Tort Statute.80
Initially, the district court dismissed the case, holding that the statute did
not permit recovery in situations involving a country's treatment of its own citizens.8t On appeal, the Second Circuit interpreted the statute differently, holding
that the statute grants jurisdiction when an alien sues an alleged torturer within
the borders of the United States.82 The Filartiga family ended up collecting over
See id. (discussing a "continuum of analysis").
7
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77.
74
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
7
Only two cases interpreted the Alien Tort Statute prior to 1980. The Act was discussed in
Adra v. Clft, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) and Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C.
1795).
76
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
7
Id. at 878.
78
Id. at 878-79.
72

79

80
81

82

Id
Id.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 878.
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$10 million under the statute, and a new era of cases was born-cases in
which the federal courts had jurisdiction over claims for torts that allegedly occurred outside the country.
The Supreme Court has taken only one case involving the interpretation
of the Alien Tort Statute, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.84 In that case, a Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") special agent was allegedly kidnapped, tortured,
and murdered by a Mexican drug cartel.85 Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a member of the cartel, allegedly participated in the crimes. When Mexico refused to
extradite Alvarez-Machain, the DEA paid off several Mexican nationals to kidnap him and bring him to the United States.8 7 Alvarez-Machain was eventually
found not guilty in the criminal case.88 Afterwards, Alvarez-Machain brought
several tort claims under the Alien Tort Statute, claiming that his abduction and
arrest were unlawful. 8 9 The district court found that it did have jurisdiction over
the claim, but that Alvarez-Machain was not entitled to damages because the
DEA arrested him lawfully. 90 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court, holding that the DEA was liable because it could not lawfully authorize a
citizen's arrest in Mexico. 9'
The Supreme Court took the Sosa case and decided that Sosa was not
entitled to damages because the Alien Tort Statute did not create any new causes
of action; it was, on the other hand, purely jurisdictional. 9 2 Importantly, Sosa
also held that the statute gives federal courts the authority to create new causes
of action based on international norms. 93 Alvarez-Machain thus lost his case
because his abduction and arrest did not violate any international norms; it was
lawful. Jeppesen II is different because torture in the fashion alleged by the
83

CENTER

8

Id. at 697.

FOR

CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS,
Filartiga
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/past-cases/filC3%Alrtiga-v.-peC3%Bl-irala
29, 2011).
8
542 U.S. 692 (2004).

v.
Pena-Irala,
(last visited Nov.

Id. ("Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez), a Mexican physician, was present at the house and acted
to prolong the agent's life in order to extend the interrogation and torture.") (internal citation
omitted).
87
Id. at 698.
88
Id
86

89

Id
See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23433 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9,
1999).
91
See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 618-19 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc),
vacated, 374 F.3d 1384 (9th Cir. 2004).
92
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 747-49.

90

Id. at 730 ("The First Congress, which reflected the understanding of the framing generation
and included some of the Framers, assumed that federal courts could properly identify some international norms as enforceable in the exercise of § 1350 jurisdiction. We think it would be unreasonable to assume that the First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all capacity
to recognize enforceable international norms .... ").
9
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plaintiffs indisputably violates international norms. Sosa was also, however, not
a case involving the suit of a transnational corporation like Jeppesen Dataplan.
Since Sosa was decided, there has been quite an academic battle over the Alien Tort Statute and the role of transnational corporations in the extraordinary
rendition program. Numerous arguments have been advanced on the issue of
corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute. 94 This Note argues that transnational corporations can be liable under an "aiding and abetting" theory, 95 as used
by the Jeppesen II plaintiffs. Particularly, the plaintiffs alleged that Jeppesen
Dataplan should be liable as a transnational corporation for aiding and abetting
the torts that were allegedly committed by the CIA. Unfortunately, neither
Jeppesen II nor the Supreme Court spoke on the corporate liability issue: The
Ninth Circuit dismissed the case under the Totten bar, and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 9 6 This debate on the issue of corporate liability under the Alien
Tort Statue is far from settled, and it is not the main focus of this Note. But corporations should face potential liability under the statute because transnational
corporations like Jeppesen Dataplan are often more than mere bystanders to
egregious human rights violations.97 If Jeppesen Dataplan participated in the
transport of illegally abducted foreign nationals, Jeppesen Dataplan should be
liable to those foreign nationals for helping the CIA violate international norms.
V. THE JEPPESENI MAJORITY SUGGESTED SEVERAL INADEQUATE
CONGRESSIONAL REMEDIES

Jeppesen II made several suggestions for alternate procedures which
would, in theory, provide the plaintiffs in this or similar cases with a remedy:
As a starting point to this debate over the interpretation of the Alien Tort Claims Act, see
Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of CorporateLiability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 51 VA. J.
INT'L L. 353 (2011); Andrei Mamolea, The Future of CorporateAiding and Abetting Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Roadmap, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 79 (2011); David Wallach,
The Alien Tort Statute and the Limits of IndividualAccountability in InternationalLaw, 46 STAN.
94

J. INT'L L. 121 (2010).

For an excellent discussion on the challenges of fitting transnational corporations into the
existing theoretical framework for liability and accountability, see Jena Martin Amerson, What's
in a Name? TransnationalCorporationsas Bystanders Under InternationalLaw, 85 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 1 (2011). Professor Amerson argues that the transnational corporation is best-conceived as a
legal "bystander" under international law. See id at 2-3. A subsection of Professor Amerson's
article concludes that application of the bystander theory to Alien Tort claims would preclude
alien tort plaintiffs from maintaining claims against transnational corporations. Id. at 36.
96
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
9
An article from American University's Human Rights Brief argues for corporate liability
under the Alien Tort Claims Act. Alexandra Bradley, CorporateLiability Under the Alien Tort
Statute: Federal Common Law as the Standardfor Third Party Liability, 16 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 13
(2009). Particularly, Ms. Bradley argues that Sosa supports corporate liability under the Alien Tort
Claims Act because "history demonstrates that third party liability is a 'specific, universal, and
obligatory' norm under the law of nations." Id. at 15 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 732 (2004)).
95
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(1) Executive Branch remedies; (2) congressional investigations of the Executive; (3) private bills; and (4) remedial legislation.98 Each of these suggestions is
untenable as a solution. The Executive Branch is unlikely to undermine its own
policies by voluntarily compensating victims of the extraordinary rendition program.99 If the Executive Branch started divvying out monetary remedies, opponents of the extraordinary rendition program would gain momentum against the
already oft-criticized program. Next, Congress is ill-equipped to act as a makeshift judicial body for the purpose of investigating the lawfulness of the extraordinary rendition program. The third suggestion, private bills, is not going to
work in the rendition context. As detailed below, Congress uses this solution
only when the aggrieved party is sympathetic and clearly innocent. That is not
the case in the rendition context. Finally, Congress is highly unlikely to pass
remedial legislation to ensure compensation of rendition victims because such
legislation would not be politically expedient.
A.

Remedies from Within the Executive Branch

Jeppesen II suggested that the Executive Branch could decide whether it
violated the human rights of the plaintiffs and compensate them accordingly. 1oo
The court drew a surprising comparison to Japanese internment in the United
States during World War II ("WWII").o'0 This Note takes the position that the
internment camps of WWII were a major mistake, a bad policy choice, and an
eclipse of human rights. The Jeppesen II majority ignores this point by focusing
only on the fact that some internment victims were eventually compensated
years later. The court declined to use its judicial power to step in and provide a
98

Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1091-93 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

The suggestion that the Executive Branch can check its own actions flies in the face of the
tenets of our tripartite government. When left to its own devices, the Executive has a history of
engaging in underhanded activities. For example, it has only recently been revealed that the United States government was experimenting on Guatemalan prisoners in the 1940s by purposefully
infecting them with sexually transmitted diseases ("STDs"). The government was ruthlessly pursuing its interest in furthering the science of antibiotics. Ashley Portero, US. Admits to Infecting
Guatemalans with STDs in 1940s Experiments, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/206584/20110901/u-s-experiments-infected-guatemalans-withstds.htm.
100 Jeppesen I, 614 F.3d 1070, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010).
101 Id. In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Court upheld the government's
order to place Japanese-Americans in internment camps, holding that it was more important to
guard against espionage than to vindicate the individual rights of innocent Japanese-Americans.
Like the debate over the modern extraordinary rendition program, the commentary on Japanese
internment camps cuts in both directions. Some scholars defend the use of internment camps
during WWII, while others rebut such defenses. For a defense of the use of internment camps, see
Daniel Pipes, Why the JapaneseInternment Still Matters, N.Y. SuN. (Dec. 28, 2004), availableat
For the opposite
http://www.danielpipes.org/2309/why-the-japanese-internment-still-matters.
view that internment camps were unnecessary and "wrong," see Irfan Khawaja, Japanese Internment: Why DanielPipes is Wrong, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY'S HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (June
26, 2005), http://hnn.us/articles/9512.html.
9
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remedy, as allowed by application of the Alien Tort Statute and the Reynolds
privilege. Another problem with this suggestion is that the Executive Branch is
simply not likely to compensate victims of its extraordinary rendition program,
which is an established policy choice of the Executive. To compensate victims
would be to admit that the Executive Branch commits gross violations of human
rights in the name of national security. Therefore, the Executive Branch is unlikely to acquiesce to pressure from the political and legal communities by admitting that the United States sometimes tortures suspected terrorists.
B.

CongressionalInvestigations of the Executive

The Jeppesen II majority also suggested that Congress has the authority
to "investigate alleged wrongdoing and restrain excesses by the Executive
Branch."l 02 Presumably, the majority was suggesting that Congress could form
committees and hold hearings for the purpose of questioning corporate and government officials accused of being involved in tortuous activities. To support
this suggestion, the majority cited Watkins v. United States 0 3 and Eastland v.
U.S. Servicemen's Fund,'04 both cases dealing with remedial legislation used by
Congress to assist the efforts of the Executive during and shortly after WWII.
The events at issue in Watkins stemmed from hearings held before the
congressional Committee on Un-American Activities during the 1940s. 05 The
Committee was authorized to enact remedial legislation.'06 The purpose of the
Committee was essentially to identify Communists living in America and attempt to prevent the dissemination of Communist propaganda.'o Petitioner
Watkins was identified as a suspected Communist and forced to testify before
Congress."o0 Watkins was convicted of a misdemeanor for refusing to make
certain disclosures.09 When the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction, it reversed, holding that Watkins's conviction violated the Due Process Clause because the Court could not even determine from the record whether the questions
Watkins refused to answer were even pertinent to the congressional inquiry."10
The Court stated that "Congress [is not] a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government.""'
102

Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d at 1090.

103

354 U.S. 178 (1957).
421 U.S. 491 (1975).

104

See 354 U.S. at 182 ("[Watkins] appeared as a witness in compliance with a subpoena issued by a Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives.").
106 Id. at 202.
107
Id. at 201-02.
108
Id. at 182-83.
105

1o9

Id

11o Id. at 187.
"I

Id.
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This demonstrates that congressional hearings are not a suitable solution for the
problem of alleged torture in the extraordinary rendition program. Congress is
simply not equipped to adjudicate alien tort claims.
In Eastlandv. US. Servicemen's Fund,'l2 Congress formed a Committee to enforce the Internal Security Act of 1950, which was designed to identify
Communists under Soviet control living within the United States." 3 The Committee had directed a bank to produce records related to a nonprofit membership
corporation supported by contributions. 114 When the nonprofit corporation objected on First Amendment grounds, the Court held that the legislative purpose
served by the Committee outweighed the corporation's interest in unfettered
free speech.115 Eastland merely established that Congress can obtain private
records from private companies to further a "legitimate task of Congress."ll6
Eastland is inapposite to the circumstances of the extraordinary rendition program because a branch of the United States government already possesses the
information about the extraordinary rendition program. In Eastland, the government was seeking to uncover information from a private bank.' 17 Contrariwise, in Jeppesen II, the government was seeking to keep information that it
already possessed from being used as evidence in a tort suit under the Alien Tort
Statute. Watkins and Eastlandare not even examples of Congress using "authority to investigate alleged wrongdoing and excesses by the Executive Branch."' 18
Rather, those two cases are examples of Congress working in concert with the
Executive to eradicate the Communist problem which plagued the world in the
1940s and 1950s. The majority's suggestion of remedial legislation is also a
problem of motivation and politics. Congress is not sufficiently motivated to
allocate resources for the purpose of investigating this type of alleged torture of
suspected terrorists. With the recent financial crisis, fierce debates over
healthcare, employment, and the debt ceiling have substantially consumed the
time and resources of Congress." 9 Although the alleged human rights violations
are undoubtedly troublesome, the constituents of Congress largely dictate the
congressional agenda. And those constituents simply have other priorities.
Moreover, there is still widespread fear of future terrorist attacks. It is
still quite common to hear of incidents on domestic and international flights in
112
113

114
1s
116

"
118

421 U.S. 491 (1975).
Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 506-07.
Id. at 505-06.
Id. at 494.
See supra text accompanying note 102.

"
See, e.g., Jeanne Sahadi, Debt ceiling: Timing and nertfight, CNNMONEY (July 26, 2011),
(dehttp://money.cnn.com/2011/07/25/newsleconomy/debt ceiling increase-timing/index.htm
scribing the debt ceiling debate as a "bitter, distracting . . . debate that has consumed Congress in
recent months").
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which a terrorist plot was foiled or discovered before it came to fruition.120 These factors make it unlikely that Congress will spend the requisite time and money to provide a monetary remedy for victims of the extraordinary rendition program. Even if Congress were to launch an investigation, the Executive Branch
would probably be uncooperative; this would certainly drive-up the cost of an
effective investigation by causing Congress to spend valuable time and money
trying to force the Executive to produce sought information. At a time when this
war against terrorist organizations has persisted for far too long and contributed
to so many expenditures,121 it is nearly unfathomable that Congress would do
anything to add to the expense or to create the perception that it does not stand
in solidarity with the Executive on the terrorism issue. Thus, the tenured, appointed judges in the federal circuits should start providing the remedy in situations where foreign nationals are alleging torture at the hands of the United
States government with the assistance of transnational corporations.
C.

PrivateBills

Jeppesen H1 next suggested that Congress could use its power to enact
private bills as an alternative remedy.122 A private bill is a narrow law passed
for one particular reason. In this context, Congress could pass a law ordering a
monetary payment to a victim of the extraordinary rendition program. Several
problems make private bills an unlikely fix for the human rights violations
caused by the state secrets doctrine. Particularly, none of the cases cited by the
Jeppesen H1 majority involved the state secrets doctrine. Also, the cases cited by
the majority involved plaintiffs who were much more sympathetic than the
Jeppesen H plaintiffs. Perhaps the most significant barrier to the private bills
suggestion is the current political climate.
To enact private bills as remedies, Congress would need to set up an
administrative system designed to hear the individual claims of suspected terrorSee, e.g., US.: UnderwearBomber Said he Worked for Al Qaeda, ASSOCIATED PREss Aug.
2011,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/08/26/us-underwear-bomber-said26,
worked-for-al-qaeda/; Greig Box Turnbull, Al-Qaeda Plot to Kidnap Belmarsh Jail Boss Foiled
by Late Tip-off, DAILY MIRROR, Aug. 23, 2011, availableat http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/topstories/20 11/08/23/al-qaeda-plot-to-kidnap-belmarsh-jail-boss-foiled-by-late-tip-off- 11587523364578/.
121
See Christopher Weber, War on Terrorism has Cost the U.S. over $1 Trillion so far, Report
Says, POLITICSDAILY.COM (July 21, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/07/21/war-onterrorism-has-cost-u-s-over-1-trillion-so-far-report/.
122
Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d 1070, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2010). The majority cited several examples
of private bills, including Nixon v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 731, 762 n.5 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("For uncompensated injuries Congress may in its discretion provide separate nonjudicial
remedies such as private bills."); Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 431 (1990)
("Congress continues to employ private legislation to provide remedies in individual cases of
hardship."); and Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995) ("Private bills in
Congress are still common, and were even more so in the days before establishment of the Claims
Court.").
120
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ists who allege human rights violations by the Executive Branch. 123 The majority cited Nixon v. Fitzgeraldl24 for the proposition that Congress can provide
non-judicial remedies for uncompensated injuries. In Nixon, Fitzgerald was fired
from his position as a management analyst for the Air Force.12 5 Fitzgerald, in
turn, filed suit against former President Richard M. Nixon for retaliatory discharge. 26 The Supreme Court agreed with Nixon that the suit was barred because Nixon had absolute immunity. 12 7 In the Court's view, absolute immunity
could be upheld because the President was subject to constant scrutiny and other
political checks.12 8 Acknowledging that it could not provide a remedy for Fitzgerald, the Court suggested that "alternative remedies and deterrents" existed to
compensate Fitzgerald.129
Jeppesen II also cited Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm'30 as an example in
which the Court suggested that a private bill would be an appropriate remedy.
Plaut consisted of investors who sought to reopen a final judgment against them
after Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was amended to
allow certain final judgments to be reopened. The Court decided that the
amendment to the Act was unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of
powers because the judiciary's final judgments must not be disturbed.' 3 ' Otherwise, Congress could simply pass legislation to change the result of disputes that
32
are resjudicata.1
Another case cited by Jeppesen II regarding the use of private bills as a
remedy was Office of PersonnelManagement v. Richmond,33 which involved a
disabled worker who was claiming a disability annuity. The claimant received
incorrect advice from a federal worker and, as a result, became ineligible for
assistance under the disability statute because his earnings were too high.13 4 The
Supreme Court refused to order payment of the annuity, holding that it was not
See generally Lionel Marks Lavenue, Patent Infringement Against the United States and
Government Contractors Under 28 US.C. § 1498 In the United States Court ofFederalClaims, 2
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389, 401-02 (1995) (discussing a private bill system designed to compensate
those alleging damages under a federal statute).
123

124

457 U.S. 731 (1982).

Id. at 733-34.
Id at 739.
127
Id at 756-57.
128
Id. at 757.
129
Id. at 758. See also Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Fitzgerald,which explicitly notes that "[flor uncompensated injuries Congress may in its discretion provide separate
nonjudicial remedies such as private bills." Id. at 763 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
130
514 U.S. 211 (1995).
131
Id at 231-32.
125

126

132

Id

'3

496 U.S. 414 (1990).

134

Id. at 415-18.
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able to order payments that were not authorized by the statute. 13 5 Instead, the
Court stated that Congress might consider enacting a private bill to compensate

the claimant. 136
Jeppesen II was quite different from Fitzgerald, Plaut, and Office of
PersonnelManagement. None of the other cases involved the state secrets doctrine. Additionally, each of the other cases involved plaintiffs who appeared to
be categorically free of any wrongdoing themselves. To the contrary, in cases
like Jeppesen II, it is much more difficult to discern whether the plaintiffs are
even entitled to a remedy because they are suspected affiliates of terrorist organizations. Additionally, the cases cited by the Jeppesen II majority were not likely to open the floodgates for similar claims if Congress chose to issue a private
bill to compensate the plaintiffs. To the contrary, the extent of the CIA's investigation of foreign nationals is unknown. And if Congress demonstrates a willingness to compensate plaintiffs without requiring the plaintiffs to prove their
allegations against the CIA, there is no telling how many new plaintiffs will
emerge in similar attempts to be compensated without having to prove allegations. How will Congress know whether the new claimants are telling the truth
or merely fabricating stories of torture and human rights violations? Will the
Executive voluntarily hand over necessary information so a determination can
be made? As stated above, this is highly unlikely.
Equally unlikely is the suggestion that Congress, comprised of elected
politicians subject to losing elections, will risk the political consequences of
compensating alleged terrorists. As stated above, this is especially true considering the current circumstances. In the November 2010 elections, the Republicans
regained control of the House. The national debt is at an all-time high at over
$14 trillion.33 Terror threats are still commonplace during a time when the
wounds of September 11, 2001, are far from healed. These circumstances simply do not create an environment in which Congress is likely to pass private bills
to compensate alleged terrorists who were possibly tortured at the hands of the
CIA in concert with foreign governments. The judiciary needs to step in and
perform its function. Thus, the private bills suggestion made in Jeppesen H1 and
cases like it-that Congress is the appropriate forum for a remedy in state secrets cases-is actually not a viable solution. Congress is simply not in a position to use private bills to compensate foreign nationals who allege human rights
violations.

Id. at 431-32.
Id. at 431.
137
Associated Press, US Debt Tops $14 Trillion, Nears Ceiling, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 17,
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpavailable
A13,
at
2011,
dyn/content/article/2011/01/16/AR2011011604005.html.
135
136
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Remedial Legislation

Jeppesen II also suggested that Congress use its "authority to enact remedial legislation authorizing appropriate causes of action and procedures to
address claims like those presented here."l 38 The only case cited by Jeppesen H
to support this suggestion was Halkin v. Helms,'" in which Executive Branch
agencies successfully asserted the state secrets privilege against antiwar protestors who sought certain documents to help prove their claim against these agencies. Affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court stated:
[W]here the Constitution compels the subordination of appellants' interest in the pursuit of their claims to the executive's duty to preserve our national security, this means that remedies for
constitutional violations that cannot be proven under existing
legal standards, if there are to be such remedies, must be provided by Congress. 140
Congress could do this in theory, but it would have to create a very
friendly administrative forum for foreign nationals thought by the Executive
Branch to be involved in organizations hostile to the United States. In fact, the
Jeppesen II majority is not the first source to suggest that administrative remedies are a tenable substitute for judicial solutions. 141 As it was stated in Jeppesen
II, it is hard to imagine a case with similar facts that would ever overcome the
state secrets doctrine. The Alien Tort Statute, on its face, appears to constitute a
good remedy for plaintiffs like those in Jeppesen II. Thus, it's not actually the
causes of action or the Article III courts that represent the hurdle; it is the state
secrets privilege. Congress could form a committee to compensate foreign nationals like the plaintiffs in Jeppesen II, but if anything like the state secrets
doctrine were to be applied as a prerequisite to granting relief, the result would
be the same as it was in Jeppesen II. Additionally, it is worth emphasizing that
each of the legislative remedies suggested by the Jeppesen II majority is equally
unlikely to occur because of the current political climate.

Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d 1070, 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d
977,
1001 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
139
690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

138

140

Id. at 1001.

See, e.g., Beth George, An Administrative Law Approach to Reforming the State Secrets
Privilege, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv 1691 (2009); Harvard Law Review Association, Developments in the
Law - Access to Courts: Compensating Victims of Wrongful Detention, Torture, andAbuse in the
U.S. War on Terror, 122 HARv. L. REv. 1158, 1168-69 (2009) (suggesting that the United States
liberally compensate victims of wrongful detention by apologizing and offering a public forum for
victims to tell their stories).
141
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ELABORATION ON THE DISSENT'S WORKABLE APPROACH AND FLAWS
IN THE MAJORITY'S REASONING

Pointing out the procedural flaws of the majority's construction of the
state secrets doctrine, Judge Hawkins' dissenting opinion argued for a narrower
construction of both the Totten bar and the Reynolds privilege. The following
subsections examine the procedure set forth by Judge Hawkins and argue that
the application of a narrower state secrets doctrine would undo the total eclipse
of human rights caused by an overly broad construction of the doctrine. A narrower judicial framework would include the following: (1) applying the Totten
bar in only two narrow factual situations; (2) treating the Reynolds privilege as
an evidentiary privilege and not as a nonjusticiability doctrine; and (3) upon an
assertion of the Reynolds privilege, conducting an item-by-item analysis and
allowing a claim to survive if the plaintiff can make a prima facie case with the
use of non-privileged evidence.
A.

The Totten Bar Should Apply in Only Two NarrowFactual Situations:
Secret Agreements Between the Plaintiffand the Government and Suits
Against the Governmentfor Secret Information.

Totten was a case involving a secret agreement between the plaintiff and
the government. 142 The Supreme Court applied the Totten bar to two other cases
involving secret agreements between the plaintiff and the government: Tenet v.
Doel43 and General Dynamics Corp. v. United States.'" The plaintiffs in Tenet
were former espionage agents who sued the United States for the government's
alleged failure to provide promised financial assistance for the agents' espionage services.145 The Supreme Court decided that the Totten bar precluded the
lawsuit from going to the merits because a clandestine spy relationship was a
fact not to be revealed. 146 Likewise, the Court applied the Totten bar in General
Dynamics to a contract dispute between the Navy and two private companies
that agreed to develop a stealth aircraft for the Navy. Thus, the Totten bar clearly applies to cases involving a secret agreement between the plaintiff and the
government.
Besides the two cases involving secret agreements between the plaintiff
and the government, the Supreme Court has applied the Totten bar to only one
other factual situation. In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, the Court
applied the Totten bar to dismiss a lawsuit for information regarding the possi-

142
143
1
145
14

See supra text accompanying note 14.
544 U.S. 1 (2005).
131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011).
544 U.S. at 3.
Id. at 10.
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ble environmental consequences of a military facility. 147 Surprisingly, Weinberger extended Totten without even performing a Totten analysis, citing Totten
and conclusively stating that "[we] confront a similar situation in the instant
case."1 48 As Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion pointed out in Weinberger,
the FOIA was, alone, an adequate basis for dismissal of the claims. 149 The Supreme Court, then, has given inadequate guidance for the proper application of
the Totten bar. This lack of guidance has enabled lower courts to develop a myriad of different interpretations, thereby making it nearly impossible for foreign
nationals to be compensated for human rights violations. Accordingly, the Totten bar should be applied only when there is a secret agreement between the
government and the plaintiff, or when the plaintiff has sued for information under the FOIA.
For two additional reasons, Totten should not be applied outside of the
narrow circumstances of Totten and Tenet, or of Weinberger. First, the Totten
bar has "extremely harsh consequences," is "rarely applied," and is "not clearly
defined."so Second, the Reynolds privilege provides a less drastic mechanism to
ensure that state secrets are not disclosed in litigation. Thus, the majority of
Jeppesen II was incorrect to imply that its discretion is broad in determining
whether the Totten bar applies to a case in which the government asserts the
state secrets doctrine. Moreover, Jeppesen II should have stated that the Totten
bar was inapplicable.
The majority pointed out that the "purpose of the bar .

.

. is to prevent

151

the revelation of state secrets harmful to national security." On that basis, the
majority argued that the Totten bar might have been applicable because the concern of revealing state secrets is "no less pressing when the plaintiffs are
strangers to the espionage agreement that their litigation threatens to reveal."1 52
But the three cases in which the Supreme Court applied the Totten bar simply
fail to provide an adequate basis for the expansive interpretation of the Totten
bar by the majority in Jeppesen II. And considering the safety net that is the
Reynolds privilege, there is no reason for courts to transform the state secrets
doctrine into a doctrinal amoeba by conflating the Reynolds privilege with the
Totten bar.
The majority conceded that the "absolute protection" provided by the
Totten bar is "appropriate only in narrow circumstances." 5 3 Nonetheless, the
See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 147 (1981).
149
See id. at 149-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining that it was not necessary to reach
the Totten issue because the FOIA exempted disclosure of a report that was necessary for the
plaintiffs to litigate the claims).
Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010).
150
147
148

151

Id at 1079.

152

Id.

1

Id. at 1084 (quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005)).
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majority stated that the Totten bar might be applicable to Jeppesen II because
the plaintiffs in Weinberger were third-party plaintiffs. 154 It does not, however,
necessarily follow that a court has discretion to apply Totten in any case in
which the plaintiff is not a party to an agreement with the government. The Totten bar has drastic results, and the Reynolds privilege provides additional support to the purpose of the Totten bar. Thus, it is unnecessary and unwise for circuit courts to take occasion to expand the scope of Totten without any further
support in Supreme Court precedent.
B.

The Reynolds PrivilegeShould Not Be Used Like the Totten Bar to
Dismiss a Claim Based on a ProspectiveAssertion of the State Secrets
Privilege.

The Totten bar and the Reynolds privilege should not be conflated because the doctrines have a very different effect on the course of litigation. If the
Totten bar applies, the case simply comes to an immediate end. On the other
hand, if the Reynolds privilege is properly applied, the case is allowed to proceed slowly until the judge determines whether the claim can be proven with
non-privileged evidence. Thus, when courts apply the Reynolds privilege like it
is the Totten bar, alien tort plaintiffs are wrongly deprived of the opportunity to
recover.
1.

Ignoring its own precedent, Jeppesen II conflated the subject
matter of the lawsuit with the facts necessary to litigate it.

Analytically, the definition of "subject matter" is important because the
Totten bar requires dismissal of a claim in which the "very subject matter" of
the lawsuit is a state secret.' 55 The Jeppesen II majority ignored its remarks in a
15 6
previous Ninth Circuit case: Al-HaramainIslamic Foundationv. Bush. In AlHaramain, the plaintiffs alleged that President Bush was violating the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act by employing a Terrorist Surveillance Program
("TSP"), in which the government was intercepting telephone calls and other
communications. 157 The Al-Haramain court dismissed the claims under the
Reynolds privilege, not the Totten bar.58 Al-Haramain is an excellent illustration of the manner in which the Reynolds privilege ensures the preservation of
state secrets, even when the narrow Totten bar does not apply. In declining to
apply the Totten bar, Al-Haramain noted the important distinction between the
"subject matter" of a case and the facts necessary to litigate the case:
154
155
156

'5
158

Id. at 1079.
See id at 1099 n.14 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007).
See id. at 1193.
See id. at 1201-02.
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In contrast, we do not necessarily view the "subject matter" of a
lawsuit as one and the same with the facts necessary to litigate
the case. In Kasza, we made the distinction between dismissal
on the grounds that the subject matter of an action is a state secret, and dismissal on the grounds that a plaintiff cannot prove
the prima facie elements of the claim absent privileged evidence." 9
In Jeppesen II, the subject matter of the lawsuit was Jeppesen's involvement in an overseas detention program.'60 The existence of the extraordinary rendition program was not a state secret because it was publicly acknowledged.16 1 In Al-Haramain, the public acknowledgement of the TSP was sufficient to trigger a finding by the Ninth Circuit that the very subject matter of the
litigation was not a state secret.162 Jeppesen II, however, did not apply the logic
of Al-Haramain. Instead, Jeppesen I unnecessarily expanded the scope of the
Totten bar in the Ninth Circuit by conflating the "very subject matter" of a lawsuit with the facts necessary to litigate the case. The expansion of the bar's
scope was particularly unwarranted because Jeppesen II was decided under the
Reynolds privilege, not the Totten bar.
2.

Like the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied the
Reynolds privilege without first requiring a responsive pleading.

In a similar case, the Fourth Circuit erroneously expanded the Reynolds
evidentiary privilege. In El-Masri v. United States,'63 the plaintiff was a former
terrorism suspect who alleged that the CIA unlawfully detained and interrogated
him. Like the plaintiffs in Jeppesen II, El-Masri sued under the Alien Tort Statute.'
El-Masri argued that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint
prior to the filing of a responsive pleading because the CIA's extraordinary rendition program had become public knowledge.165 The court affirmed the dismissal of the claim under the Reynolds privilege because the claim could not be
litigated without threatening the disclosure of state secrets.166 Similarly,
Jeppesen II dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under the Reynolds privilege, even
though the transnational corporation had not yet answered the complaint.
1s9

Id. at 1201.

Id. at 1097 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1098.
162
Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1198 ("[T]he administration publicly acknowledged that . . . the
President authorized a communications surveillance program ....
163
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
164
Id. at 300-01.
165
Id. at 302.
160

161

16

See id. at 312-13.
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Both El-Masri and Jeppesen II applied the Reynolds privilege improperly. As Judge Hawkins articulated in his Jeppesen II dissenting opinion, the
Rules of Civil Procedure and the historical application of evidentiary privileges
require a responsive pleading and a detailed analysis by the court before any
claim is precluded on summary judgment.16 7 Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(b)(6), an allegation is deemed admitted unless it is denied.16 8 However,
a defendant can assert an evidentiary privilege to prevent an allegation from
being deemed admitted.169 Even when a privilege is asserted a defendant is still
required to file a responsive pleading. 170 And even the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "'protects an individual . . . from answering spe-

cific allegations in a complaint or filing responses to interrogatories in a civil
action where the answers' would violate his rights under the privilege.""'7 Other
evidentiary privileges which follow this procedure include attorney/client and
priest/penitent. None of these common privileges, however, warrant the automatic dismissal of a case where there is non-privileged evidence available for

litigation.17 2
Likewise, the Reynolds privilege should not bar the use of nonprivileged evidence to prove claims involving privileged evidence, so long as
the purpose of the state secrets privilege can be served as such. The purpose of
the state secrets privilege is to "prevent the revelation of state secrets harmful to
national security .

. . ."'7

Requiring a responsive pleading, however, does not

endanger this purpose because the government, in its answer, can assert the
privilege as to each and every allegation on the complaint. Then the court can
examine the privilege claims on at item-by-item basis to determine if any of the
privileged information is indispensable to the plaintiffs claim. If so, judgment
in favor of the defendant would be warranted because the plaintiff would have
no feasible way to prove the allegations. In Jeppesen II, the existence of

Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d 1070, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6).
169
Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d at 1098 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (citing N. River Ins. Co., Inc. v.
Stefanou, 831 F.2d 484, 486-87 (4th Cir. 1987)).
170
Id.
167
168

"'
172

Id.
Judge Hawkins explained as follows:

Because the Reynolds privilege, like any other evidentiary privilege, "extends
only to [evidence] and not to facts. . . " Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 395-96, (1981) (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205
F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)), it cannot be invoked to prevent a litigant
from persuading a jury of the truth or falsity of an allegation by reference to
non-privileged evidence, regardless whether privileged evidence might also be
probative of the truth or falsity of the allegation.
Id. at 1099 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
173
Id. at 1079.
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nonprivileged public information was a feasible way for the plaintiffs to prove
the claims.
The Jeppesen II majority relied on an Eighth Circuit case, Black v.
United States, to support the manner in which it prospectively applied the Reynolds privilege.174 But Black does not support prospective application of the
Reynolds privilege. In Black, the plaintiff was an electrical engineer who had
performed work for the government on military-related projects. 17' The plaintiff
alleged that he was approached and questioned by a CIA agent regarding the
plaintiffs contact with a Soviet national. 176 Subsequently, the plaintiffs government clearance was terminated, purportedly for inactivity.1 77 The Black
plaintiff alleged that the government mounted a protracted psychological attack
against him. Included in the defendant's allegations was everything from being secretly drugged to having the carpet in his apartment bugged. 7
Ultimately, the Black court decided that the Reynolds privilege required
dismissal of the case because the plaintiff had no non-privileged evidence to
prove that the meeting with the CIA agent ever occurred.'" 0 But Jeppesen II is
distinguishable from Black. Unlike the Black plaintiffs, the Jeppesen II plaintiffs
had non-privileged evidence to demonstrate that Jeppesen was performing planning and logistical services for the CIA. The Jeppesen II majority conducted no
item-by-item analysis of governmental claims of privilege. Nor did it determine
that privileged evidence was indispensable to all the plaintiffs' claims. Instead,
Jeppesen II simply accepted the government's threshold objection that litigation
was bound to compel the disclosure of evidence which, if disclosed, would be
harmful to national security.' 8 ' Thus, the majority's reliance on Black was improper.
Jeppesen II also improperly relied on the Ninth Circuit case, Kasza v.
Browner, for support that a case is properly dismissed under Reynolds prior to
the filing of a responsive pleading. The plaintiffs in Kasza v. Browner82 were
83
former workers at a classified facility operated by the United States Air Force.
The plaintiffs sought to compel compliance by the Air Force with hazardous
waste inventory, inspection, and disclosure responsibilities.18 4 The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants
174

Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995).

17s

Id. at 1116.

176

Id

177

Id

17s

See id. at 1116-17.

179

Id.
Id. at 1119.

ISO
181
182

See Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d 1070, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2010) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998).

183

Id. at 1162.

18

Id.
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because the very subject matter of the action was a state secret." Nor could the
Kasza plaintiffs make a prima facie case on any of the claims without resorting
to privileged evidence.186
On the contrary, the plaintiffs in Jeppesen II could very likely make out
a prima facie case with non-privileged evidence on at least some of the claims.
Even the majority in Jeppesen II acknowledged that "allegations based on plaintiffs' theory that Jeppesen should be liable simply for what it 'should have
known' about the alleged unlawful extraordinary rendition program while participating in it are not so obviously tied to proof of a secret agreement between
Jeppesen and the government."' 187 By this logic, it would seem that the majority
would have chosen against dismissing those claims summarily, considering the
majority's emphasis on the Jeppesen's secret agreement with the government.
But instead, the Jeppesen II majority relied on the sweeping proposition that
proceeding with the litigation would risk divulging state secrets.188
There is another more fundamental problem with the majority's reliance
on Kasza for the proposition that Reynolds does not necessarily require the filing of a responsive pleading: the Kasza defendant filed a responsive pleading. In
Kasza, the claims were not disposed of until the court considered the privilege
claims at summary judgment.' 89 The procedural posture of Kasza was thus different from the procedural posture of Jeppesen II. The Jeppesen II majority
should have thus distinguished Kasza and forced the government to file a responsive pleading. That would have allowed the majority to conduct a more
detailed analysis of the privilege claims.
C.

The ProperAnalysis ofan Assertion of the Reynolds Privilege is an
Item-by-Item Inquiry After the Defendant Answers the Complaint, and
the Reynolds Privilege Should Not Bar a Claim if the UnderlyingFacts
Can be Proven with Non-Privileged Evidence.

Instead of requiring the government to assert the privilege as to individual items on the complaint, the Jeppesen II majority wiped-out the plaintiffs'
entire complaint with a sweeping preliminary assertion that there was no way
any of the allegations could be proven without risking the disclosure of state
secrets. But the basis of some of the allegations in the complaint was public
information. And the majority could not really know that its sweeping assertion
was accurate without taking a closer look at the individual allegations to which
the government asserted the Reynolds privilege. Since the majority did not require the government to file a responsive pleading, the majority had no oppor185

See id. at 1170.

186

Id.
Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d 1070, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2010).

187

188

Id. at 1087.

189

Id. at 1100 n.15 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
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tunity to perform an item-by-item analysis of the claims against which the government asserted the privilege. Two cases from other circuits demonstrate the
use of the item-by-item analysis for which this Note argues.
In Crater Corp. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.,190 the plaintiff was a patentee who alleged that the defendants infringed the plaintiffs patent to an underwater coupling device called the "Crater coupler."l 91 The plaintiff also filed
state law claims against one of the defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of contract.192 The government intervened and sought to prohibit the plaintiff from introducing into litigation any information relating to the
manufacture or use of the Crater coupler by the United States government.193
The district court dismissed the suit under the state secrets doctrine.'94 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the misappropriation and
breach of contract claims, holding that an understanding of the precise nature of
the trade secrets and the terms of the contract was essential to the analysis of
whether the claims could proceed under the Reynolds privilege. 195
Crater Corp. thus interpreted and applied the Reynolds privilege differently than did Jeppesen II. Unlike Jeppesen II, CraterCorp. declined to dismiss
the case at the threshold, instead opting to remand the case for an item-by-item
inquiry which would develop the record for the purpose of enabling a determination as to whether further litigation was feasible without divulging state secrets.' 96 Crater Corp. applied the Reynolds privilege as the evidentiary privilege
that it is, while Jeppesen II applied the Reynolds privilege in a manner which
had the effect of a Totten bar. The Totten bar has a drastic effect and is supposed
to be used scarcely. As stated above, the Reynolds evidentiary privilege is morphed into a nonjusticiability doctrine when courts dismiss a case before requiring a responsive pleading.
Additionally, the trial judge should always perform a detailed inquiry of
each privilege claim. In Ellsberg v. Mitchell,'97 the plaintiffs were the subjects
of warrantless electronic surveillance by the federal government.'9 8 The plaintiffs sought damages for the warrantless surveillance.19 9 The district court dismissed the claims which pertained to surveillance of foreign communications. 200
On appeal, the court held that the dismissal by the district court was improper
190

'1
192

423 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1261-62.

194

Id. at 1262-63.
Id. at 1265.

195

Id at 1268-69.

196

See id.

19

709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id at 53.

19

198

199

Id

200

Id. at 56.
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because the trial judge needed to perform a more detailed inquiry of the privilege claims before dismissing the entire suit. 20 1 This application of the Reynolds
privilege is at odds with Jeppesen II, in which the court dismissed all the claims
at the threshold instead of performing an item-by-item analysis. Jeppesen II's
blind acceptance of the government's privilege claim constituted a "complete
abandonment of judicial control" and very likely enabled "intolerable abus-

es."202
As discussed above, other evidentiary privileges do not bar the allegations from being proven with non-privileged evidence. The D.C. Circuit has
properly applied the Reynolds privilege by considering and allowing the use of
non-privileged evidence to prove underlying facts. In In re Sealed Case,203 the
plaintiff was an attach6 in Burma for the United States DEA. 204 The plaintiff
filed a Bivens complaint, alleging that the CIA engaged in electronic eavesdropping in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 205 The district court dismissed both
a claim against a CIA employee and a claim against a State Department employee.206 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
against the CIA employee because the plaintiff could not prove the allegations
against the CIA employee without using privileged reports. 207 In re Sealed Case
reversed the dismissal of the claim against the State Department employee because the plaintiff could rely on non-privileged evidence to establish a prima
facie case against the State Department employee.208 Likewise, in Jeppesen II,
the court should have allowed to survive the claims which did not require proof
of an agreement because those claims could conceivably be proven with the
non-privileged, public evidence which was available to the plaintiffs.
Also, the Jeppesen II majority mischaracterized dicta from In re Sealed
Case. The majority cited In re Sealed Case for the proposition that, "if the district court determines that the subject matter of a case is so sensitive that there is
no way it can be litigated without risking national secrets, then the case must be
dismissed." 2 09 But this portion of In re Sealed Case is merely part of a larger
explanation of the state secrets doctrine. 210 Although In re Sealed Case cited no
authority for the previous statement, the court's use of the clause "subject matter" indicates that it was actually referring to the Totten bar, not the Reynolds
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

208

See id.at 63.
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953).
494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Id at 141.
Id
Id. at 141-42.
Id at 153-54.

See id

Jeppesen II, 614 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting El-Masri v. United States, 479
F.3d 296, 308 (4th Cir. 2007)).
210
See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 153-54 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
209

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

29

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 11

WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

1118

[Vol. 114

privilege. Nonetheless, the Jeppesen H majority used that statement about the
Totten bar to support its interpretation of the Reynolds privilege.2 11 Because the
comment in In re Sealed Case was not referring to the Reynolds privilege,
Jeppesen II cited In re Sealed Case for a proposition which is not supported by
the text of In re Sealed Case.
A case from the Northern District of Illinois is a good illustration of the
manner in which a court should treat non-privileged, public information as evidence. In ACLU v. NationalSecurity Agency, 212 the plaintiffs alleged that a warrantless wiretapping program violated the First and Fourth Amendments.2 13 The
plaintiffs filed a data-mining claim and claims which challenged the validity of
the program. 214 The court dismissed the data-mining claim but granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the claims challenging the validity of the
wiretapping program because the plaintiffs relied on no privileged information
to prove those claims.215 Ultimately, the court held that the wiretapping program
violated the First and Fourth Amendments, and was inconsistent with the separation of powers because the procedure for implementing the program was not
216
followed as laid-out by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
This application of the state secrets doctrine again demonstrates that
Jeppesen II could have given more weight to the existence of public,
nonprivileged information. Courts in other circuits, and even the Ninth Circuit
in Al-Haramain, demonstrate time and again that state secrets can still be protected when the plaintiffs use public, non-privileged information to prove the
underlying facts of their claims-even when the government properly asserts
the Reynolds privilege. If information is made public, it simply is not a secret
any longer. To hold otherwise is a needless expansion of the Reynolds privilege
at the expense of human rights-a total eclipse of human rights.
This is not to say that the result in Jeppesen II would inevitably have
been different if the court would have performed an item-by-item analysis of the
privilege claims. It is entirely possible that the court would have determined that
privileged evidence was essential to the plaintiffs' claims or to the defendant's
defense of the allegations. But the determination was made prematurely, before
even a responsive pleading was filed by the defendant. There was no need for
the Jeppesen II majority to dismiss the case at the threshold without even allowing the plaintiffs to attempt to prove their claims with nonprivileged evidence.

Jeppesen I, 614 F.3d at 1083.
212
438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated on other grounds, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.
2007).
213
Id. at 758.
211

214

Id

215

See id at 766-67.
Id. at 778 (Jackson, J., concurring).

216
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VII. CONCLUSION

Victims of the extraordinary rendition program should have a fair opportunity to be compensated under the Alien Tort Statute. Judge Hawkins put
forth a viable judicial framework in his dissenting Jeppesen II opinion. By
broadening the Totten bar, federal courts have completely abandoned judicial
control and enabled intolerable abuses, including torture.217 In our age of terrorism, the balance between national security and individual rights is difficult to
strike. It is a problem not easily solved. America is certainly a humanitarian
country. At the same time, extremists throughout the world are a real threat to
humankind. And the Executive Branch undoubtedly performs an indispensable
function by fighting against extremists.
But victims of the extraordinary rendition program should receive a civil remedy after they are unlawfully tortured and discarded in their homelands by
the United States government with the assistance of transnational corporations.
The political climate is not right for a legislative solution, and the Executive
Branch will certainly attempt to avoid doing anything that might undermine its
own policies. That leaves it up to the only other branch of government-the
Judicial Branch. It remains to be seen whether other federal judges will join in
Judge Hawkins's efforts to end the eclipse of human rights by compensating
victims of the extraordinary rendition program for injuries they suffered at
American hands.

John P. Blanc*

217

See supra text accompanying note 6.
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I thank everyone on the West Virginia Law Review for performing the work that allows for
the successful publication of works like this one. Additionally, I thank Professor Gregory Bowman for advising me in a manner that allowed me to freely develop the ideas that constitute this
Note. Any remaining errors belong only to me.
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